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Abstract
This paper investigates whether risk sharing, measured as income and consumption
smoothing, among countries in the EU and the European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) has increased since the adoption of the euro. We ask: Have the recent
increase in foreign equity and debt holdings been associated with more risk sharing?
Do certain classes of assets (debt, equity, foreign direct investment) provide relatively
more or less risk sharing? Do liabilities provide risk sharing di®erently from assets?
Do investments in EMU countries provide more or less risk sharing per euro invested
compared to investments in non-EMU countries? Has increased banking integration
improved risk sharing? Due to the short span of years since the introduction of the
euro, our results are tentative, but they indicate that the monetary union has facilitated
risk sharing, although the level of risk sharing is still much below the level found among
U.S. states.
¤This study was conducted with ¯nancial support from the European Commission, contract
ECFIN/263/2007/477567. We thank Marie Donnay for comments and advice. The views expressed herein
are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily re°ect the views of Norges Bank, the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.Executive Summary
This paper investigates whether risk sharing in Europe has increased since the adoption of
the euro. We consider the e®ect on risk sharing of diversi¯ed ¯nancial ownership for both
EMU countries and EU countries outside the monetary union.
Diversi¯ed ¯nancial ownership may lead to better risk sharing if the income °ows from
foreign asset holdings help separate a country's income growth rate from the growth rate
of its output, so-called \income risk sharing." If a country can issue any kind of assets
that makes its income proportional to aggregate EMU output, perfect risk sharing among
EMU members will have been accomplished. In principle, this could be achieved by issuing
liabilities that transfer the right to domestic output to foreign investors, while using the
proceeds to purchase rights to aggregate EMU output.
While perfect income risk sharing is unlikely to be achieved, a country may achieve a
high degree of risk sharing if the return on foreign assets is highly correlated with EMU
output growth and the return on foreign liabilities is highly correlated with domestic output
growth. Such correlations would help smooth a country's income relative to its output
and the level of income risk sharing would be roughly proportional to the quantities of
foreign assets held and liabilities issued. We therefore consider the e®ect of EMU countries'
portfolio diversi¯cation on risk sharing.
We measure the amount of \consumption risk sharing" obtained beyond income risk
sharing, that is, the degree to which the growth rate in consumption is detached from output
growth. Consumption risk sharing is determined by income risk sharing and by patterns of
saving. Simpli¯ed, one may think of the way people share risk as a situation where people
¯rst attempt to insure their income as much as possible by holding a diversi¯ed portfolio,
and conditional on income, decide how much to further smooth consumption by adjusting
saving.
We also consider the e®ect of banking market integration on risk sharing. Banks may
a®ect risk sharing through their lending behavior and hence banking integration may work
as a channel of risk sharing in addition to that of ¯nancial asset ownership. Both domestic
and foreign banking consolidation may be associated with improved risk sharing and we
consider the e®ect of both.
Our empirical results are as follows. We document that overall income risk sharing
has been higher in the ¯ve years following the introduction of the euro than during the
previous ¯ve year period, and that the improvement has been higher for the group of EMU
members. In the same period, however, overall consumption risk sharing has decreased,except among EMU members. Our results imply that ¯nancial integration between the
EMU countries, and ¯nancial globalization in general, has facilitated the smoothing of
income. We suggest that temporary shifts in consumption in response to, e.g., taste shocks
or increased availability of credit, are responsible for the dis-smoothing of consumption.
We further show that international portfolio diversi¯cation has increased for both EU
and EMU members. We ¯nd evidence that increased holdings of foreign assets have been
associated with increased income risk sharing. The estimates are somewhat imprecise which
may re°ect that signi¯cant international integration of asset markets is very recent and still
on-going. The e®ect of diversi¯cation on risk sharing is approximately similar whether one
considers assets held against foreign residents (domestic assets) or foreigners' assets holdings
against domestic residents (domestic liabilities). Our results show, however, that assets and
liabilities invested outside the EMU have the largest e®ect on risk sharing per euro invested,
which indicates that such securities may have returns that are less correlated with the output
of the EMU countries and therefore better able to smooth income. Increasing international
asset holdings have been correlated with declining consumption risk sharing. We believe
that these are transitory patterns due to, for example, simultaneously high consumption
growth and improved availability of credit in some countries.
Finally, we investigate the e®ect of banking market integration on risk sharing. In-
come risk sharing has improved following domestic banking consolidation when we focus
on country-speci¯c trends in consolidation. However, the countries with a higher average
level of banking consolidation do not on average obtain more risk sharing. We do not ¯nd
any evidence of a similar e®ect from foreign banking consolidation, but we believe that too
little foreign consolidation has yet occurred that one may identify such an e®ect.
Overall, our results leave little doubt that the process of ¯nancial integration among
EMU countries has been associated with bene¯cial welfare e®ects, in particular in the form
of improved smoothing of income. Financial integration, however, is progressing only slowly
and the overall level of integration is still lagging behind the level of integration between
U.S. states where cross-state investment and securities holdings are much more pervasive.1 Introduction
Financial markets in the European Union (EU) are becoming better integrated following
regulatory convergence and the removal of legal barriers. One advantage of ¯nancial inte-
gration is that capital-scarce countries may receive funds from countries with higher saving,
resulting in higher growth in the capital scarce countries and better returns to saving in
countries with high saving. A second, increasingly recognized, advantage of ¯nancial in-
tegration is that diversi¯ed ¯nancial ownership promotes risk sharing. Diversi¯cation of
income sources is, of course, at the core of ¯nancial economics; however, the e®ect on con-
sumption volatility has only recently been researched.1 Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) refer to
the growth and risk sharing bene¯ts of ¯nancial integration as \development ¯nance" and
\diversi¯cation ¯nance," respectively, and point out that developed countries have obtained
large increases in diversi¯cation ¯nance in later years.
We examine whether the advent of the euro has led to better international asset diver-
si¯cation among countries in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In our analysis,
we also consider EU countries which are not in the EMU|if the euro has deepened liquid-
ity in ¯nancial markets and lowered transaction costs, this might have bene¯tted ¯nancial
integration also for non-EMU countries.
The ¯rst part of this article examines if risk sharing has increased since the creation of
the EMU and analyzes the connection between the amount of cross-border asset holdings
and risk sharing. S¿rensen, et al. (2007) ¯nd that larger holdings of foreign assets are
associated with better risk sharing for countries in the EU and the OECD. For EU countries,
they also ¯nd a trend in risk sharing that is not explained by foreign asset holdings. We
suspect this trend is explained by features of ¯nancial integration that work through other
channels than equity and bond markets. Bank intermediated ¯nance is a likely candidate for
such a channel. Several EU-initiatives with the aim of furthering integration of European
banking markets have been launched both prior to and during the period we consider.
In the second part of the article, we therefore study whether integration of EU banking
markets help explain increasing risk sharing. We proceed in a manner similar to recent
work by Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and S¿rensen (2007) who ¯nd that risk sharing between
U.S. states improved signi¯cantly following various types of banking deregulation|even
branching deregulation within states had a signi¯cant impact on risk sharing. We consider
the impact of both foreign bank entry and domestic bank consolidation.
1Early papers are Mace (1991), Obstfeld (1994), and Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996), who study
data at the individual, country, and state level, respectively.
1Our work has relevance for current EU policies and regulations because the welfare
bene¯ts of increased international asset holdings depend partly on how e®ectively ¯nan-
cial diversi¯cation may insure income and consumption against adverse output shocks. It
therefore has implications for initiatives aimed at removing regulations that limit the diver-
si¯cation of asset ownership of households, ¯rms, and ¯nancial intermediaries. For example,
restrictions on pension fund management such as minimum holdings of certain asset classes
or limitations on assets with relatively risky returns may be detrimental to the extent that
they limit households' ability to share risk. The conclusions from the banking integration
analysis have implications for the current debate over the bene¯ts and drawbacks of foreign
bank ownership and banking consolidation.
2 Risk sharing: Income smoothing and consumption smooth-
ing
The situation where consumption growth rates in all countries in a group, such as the
EMU, are identical is denoted \full (or perfect) consumption risk sharing." This will be an
equilibrium allocation if consumers have identical Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility
functions and access to a complete set of Arrow-Debreu markets|see Obstfeld and Rogo®
(1996) for a textbook treatment of risk sharing.2
The simple characterization of the equilibrium allocation makes it obvious that the exis-
tence of a full set of Arrow-securities is not necessary for reaching the optimal consumption
allocation.3 If a country can issue any kind of asset that makes its income proportional to
aggregate output, perfect risk sharing will have been accomplished. In a textbook world
this could be achieved by issuing liabilities that transfer the right to aggregate domestic
output to foreign investors, while using the proceed to purchase rights to aggregate (EMU)
output. Robert Shiller (1998), in his book \Macro Markets Creating Institutions for Man-
aging Society's Largest Economic Risks," suggests that countries establish markets in such
output-linked assets; however, such assets do not currently exist.
In the national accounts, \income" of a country, Gross National Income (GNI), equals
2The implication of the model is that consumption in each country is a constant share of aggregate
consumption, but the empirical literature, following Mace (1991), typically test the implication that growth
rates should be identical.
3Adding physical investment to the model leads to the result that each country consumes a constant
fraction of aggregate consumption rather than aggregate output, see Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996), and this
is the prediction that is usually tested. If a labor-leisure choice is added to the model consumption growth
rates will not be exactly identical but they are likely to be very similar; see Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe
(1992).
2\output," Gross Domestic Product (GDP), plus income from investments in foreign countries
minus payments on liabilities while consumption roughly equals income minus saving.4
Consider the identity:
GNI = GDP + Net Factor Income: (1)
If Net Factor Income equals the country's share in aggregate EMU output growth minus
growth in domestic output, the perfect risk sharing allocation will be obtained.5 We may
split foreign assets into three broad types: Debt (bonds or bank loans), equity, and direct
investment (FDI). We can write
Net Factor Income = rdebt;DBD ¡ rdebt;FBF + reqt;DED ¡ reqt;FEF
+ rfdi;DFDID ¡ rfdi;FFDIF ; (2)
where B is holdings of debt, E is equity, and FDI is foreign direct investment. r denotes the
realized rates of return on debt, equity, and FDI, respectively, as indicated by the ¯rst part
of the subscript. Subscript \F" denotes investments in the relevant country by foreigners
(i.e., liabilities) and \D" denotes foreign assets held by domestic residents.
Typically, high risk sharing will be achieved if the return on foreign assets is highly
correlated with EMU output growth and the return on foreign liabilities is highly correlated
with domestic output growth. The logic is that income will be smoothed if payments on
foreign liabilities are high when output growth is high and if income from foreign assets is
high when domestic output growth is low. The latter is often hard to achieve but as long
as payments from liabilities are tied more closely to domestic output than income from
foreign assets, income with be smoother than output. If the rates of return of international
assets have such bene¯cial correlations, then the amount of risk sharing obtained will be
proportional (roughly speaking) to the quantities of foreign assets and liabilities held. Good
measures of realized rates of returns on foreign assets are not easily available but we will
4In the national accounts, GNI equals GDP (the value of domestic production) plus net factor income
from the rest of the world. Net factor income from the rest of the world is net asset income plus domestic
residents' wage income from foreign countries minus wage income of foreign residents from the domestic
country. Since the latter type of factor income is based on residency rather than citizenship, it is typically
small. Subtracting depreciation and net indirect business taxes from GNI gives national income. Subtracting
corporate pro¯ts and net personal interest payments and adding transfers gives personal income. Subtracting
personal taxes gives disposable personal income and subtracting personal saving gives personal consumption.
The major part of the di®erence between GNI and consumption is gross saving which consists of depreciation
and net saving (by governments, corporations, and individuals). S¿rensen and Yosha (1998) and Balli and
S¿rensen (2007) examine the contribution of the various components of GDP to international risk sharing in
much more detail.
5Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2001) derive a formula for the equilibrium share of aggregate
output going to each country in the case of endowment economies with log-normal output °uctuations.
3examine in our empirical work if risk sharing increases with the quantities of foreign assets
traded and we will consider which categories of assets or liabilities provides better risk
sharing.
The formation of a monetary union is likely to increase ¯nancial integration in the sense
that member countries will hold more foreign assets. On the other hand, the creation of a
monetary union may lower the amount of risk sharing obtained per euro invested abroad,
if it makes the returns of assets issued by di®erent countries more similar. Convergence of
EMU rates of returns have been documented by Baele, et al. (2004).
Convergence of returns have been particularly strong for risk free government bonds
within the EMU. With the elimination of currency risk, interest rates become identical, and
if, for example, French households swap French government bonds for German government
bonds, this will not contribute to risk sharing between those countries. The returns on
corporate bonds may also become more similar but the realized return paid on, say, Spanish
corporate bonds are likely to have a higher correlation with Spanish output than risk free
Spanish government bonds if, for example, Spanish ¯rms default more often in bad times
when Spanish aggregate output is declining. Hence, the credit risk embedded in corporate
bonds may contribute to international risk sharing if the ownership of corporate bonds is
internationally diversi¯ed. A similar logic applies to the bank loan component of debt,
where domestic holdings of foreign debt BD include cross-border loans of domestic banks
to foreign residents and foreign holdings of domestic debt BF include foreign banks' cross-
border loans to domestic residents.
Financial integration may also increase the correlation of equity returns, for example if
equity returns become more a®ected by global risk tolerance, liquidity preference, discount
rates for future dividends, etc. Stock market returns, however, will also re°ect the country-
speci¯c performance of listed ¯rms and equity returns are therefore likely to be positively
correlated with the output of the issuing country.
Finally, FDI returns are likely to be more directly tied to the earnings of foreign owned
establishments, because sales are often correlated with the output of the host country and
earnings are not subject to as many °uctuations as returns on traded equity. Therefore
income streams associated with FDI assets and liabilities may be particularly e®ective in
providing risk sharing.
For each category of assets, EMU countries can invest in other EMU countries or in
the rest of the world. If market integration makes the rates of return on EMU assets
more similar, more risk sharing may be obtained from investing in non-EMU countries.6
6In this case there may be a trade-o® between lower trading costs of within-EMU investment and the
4While the returns on non-EMU assets may be less correlated with aggregate EMU output
and, therefore, not able to bring the EMU countries to the perfect risk sharing allocation,
such assets may nevertheless provide e®ective diversi¯cation bene¯ts and help lower the
correlation between income and domestic output.
Perfect income smoothing is likely an illusive goal because of moral hazard (if income
is fully insured, why work hard?) and costs of gathering information and trading assets.
However, economic agents derive utility from consumption and the perfect risk sharing
benchmark involves consumption. A slightly simpli¯ed view of how people share risk is
one where people insure their income as much as possible and, conditional on income,
decide how to further smooth consumption by adjusting their level of saving. Consider the
(simpli¯ed) identity:
CONS = GNI ¡ Gross National Saving: (3)
Procyclical saving has the potential of smoothing °uctuations in income: Individuals may
save in \good" years and dissave in \bad" years. Forward-looking risk-averse consumers
will attempt to keep a smooth path of consumption; however, rational expectation mod-
els of consumption, such as the permanent income hypothesis, do not necessarily predict
signi¯cant consumption smoothing as we measure it|if shocks are highly persistent, the
optimal behavior involves little saving in response to shocks. In other words, simple bench-
mark models are not necessarily informative about whether consumption should be more
or less smooth than income.7 Recent models stress that precautionary saving, credit ra-
tioning, and developments in housings markets may a®ect consumption.8 Consider a coun-
try where mortgage markets have historically been undeveloped and credit generally scarce.
A relaxation in credit availability is typically followed by a rapid increase in consumption
simultaneously with a rapid expansion in output. According to our measures of consump-
tion risk-sharing, this situation re°ects \dis-smoothing" as both consumption and output
jump to new higher levels. Such temporary volatility in consumption, however, is clearly
amount of diversi¯cation obtained per euro invested.
7In econometric jargon \high persistence of shocks" refers to the situation where a positive income shock
typically signals more positive income shocks to follow. Campbell and Deaton (1988) showed that U.S.
aggregate shocks tend to be so persistent that consumers according to the standard permanent income
model of Hall (1978) ought to dissave following positive shocks. The prediction is not satis¯ed by the
consumption data and this mismatch between consumption patterns and the predictions of Hall's model is
denoted \excess smoothness of consumption."
8The bu®er-stock model of consumption, popularized by Carroll (1997), assumes that agents are im-
patient (having a discount rate higher than the interest rate) and credit-constrained. While this model
also have some problems ¯tting consumption data, extensions that include housing (an illiquid asset that
can only be bought and sold at a cost) have the potential of explaining why aggregate consumption reacts
sluggishly to income as shown by Luengo-Prado and S¿rensen (2008).
5associated with bene¯cial developments and countries that have experienced a relaxation
of credit-constraints will likely also improve their ability to insure output risks, such as
productivity shocks. Because such economies are not close to a steady-state, our stylized
consumption measures will pick up dis-smoothing during the period of adjustment and will
not catch that risk sharing opportunities have in fact improved. Consumption may also
°uctuate due to \taste shocks"|that is, changes in desired consumption not explained
by income|examples could be changing fashions or changes in relative prices (electron-
ics, energy, etc.). Such desired consumption °uctuations may also make the consumption
outcomes di®er from the benchmark of stable growth rates across countries.
A signi¯cant part of consumption smoothing is due to the behavior of governments. In
this paper we treat government consumption as a perfect substitute for private consumption
and our main measure of consumption (\¯nal consumption") is the sum of government and
private consumption. Fluctuations in government consumption may be considered a form
of taste shocks: Governments may increase government consumption, for example due to
wars or hurricane damage or political expediency. If government saving is procyclical it will
smooth consumption because the saving could alternatively have been used for government
consumption or rebated to the private sector and used for private consumption. In the same
fashion, private saving smooth consumption if it is procyclical. Government and private
saving are available from the national accounts, and we estimate the contribution to risk
sharing of each in order to examine if consumption risk sharing is particularly a®ected by
government or private saving.
It is our experience that measures of income risk sharing tend to reveal trends in risk
sharing more clearly than consumption-based measures|the income-based measures are
relatively less likely to be a®ected by adjustments toward new steady-states or taste shocks.
3 Measuring risk sharing: Income smoothing and consump-
tion smoothing
As it is common in the literature we construct measures of the degree of consumption risk
sharing among groups of countries, e.g. the EMU, that takes a value of unity (100 percent)
if the growth rates of country-level consumption are identical, and, therefore, equal to the
growth rate of aggregate EMU consumption.
Denote country i's year t (per capita real, government plus private) ¯nal consumption,
Cit, and denote EMU aggregate consumption in year t, Ct. Similarly, denote country i's
6year t (real per capita) output, GDPit, and aggregate output of the EMU in year t, GDPt.
Our measures build on the observation that the correlation of country-speci¯c consumption,
¢log Cit ¡ ¢log Ct , with country-speci¯c output shocks, ¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt, is zero
under perfect risk sharing. We consider country-speci¯c growth rates because aggregate
shocks cannot be eliminated by the sharing of risk, and the aggregate component is therefore
deducted from the individual countries' growth rates. A correlation of unity has the natural
interpretation of zero percent risk sharing.
We also consider income smoothing and say that income risk sharing is perfect if country-
speci¯c (real per capita) gross national income, GNIit ¡ GNIt, is uncorrelated with country-
speci¯c output, where GNIit and GNIt are the year t per capita aggregate gross national
income of country i and the EMU, respectively. We do not present actual correlations, but
follow Mace (1991) and rely on regression coe±cients (these are proportional to correlation
coe±cients in the simplest case, but allow for more °exibility).
3.1 Year-by-year measures of risk sharing: Speci¯cation
Our empirical approach builds on the decomposition of S¿rensen and Yosha (1998). We
specify regressions that quantify deviations from perfect income and consumption risk shar-
ing, respectively.
Consider a group of countries and the following set of cross-sectional regressions|one
for each year t:
¢log GNIit ¡ ¢log GNIt = constant + ¯K;t (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it : (4)
The coe±cient ¯K;t measures the average co-movement of country-speci¯c GNI growth
with country-speci¯c GDP growth in year t. Under perfect risk sharing, the left-hand side
of equation (4) will be zero implying that ¯K;t is zero. The smaller the co-movement of
idiosyncratic GNI with GDP, the more GNI is bu®ered against GDP °uctuations and the
smaller the estimated value of ¯K;t. Since GNI equals GDP plus net factor income from
abroad, this regression measures the amount of income risk sharing provided by net factor
income °ows|the lower ¯K;t, the higher is income risk sharing in year t. The estimated
coe±cients, ¯K;t, measure the evolution of risk sharing over time. Often it is more instructive
to look at the equivalent series 1 ¡ ¯K;t. This series will take the value one if risk sharing
is perfect and the value zero if GNI moves one-to-one with output.
7In a similar manner, we estimate year-by-year the relation
¢log Cit ¡ ¢log Ct = constant + ¯C;t (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it ; (5)
where Cit is country i's year t per capita ¯nal consumption, and Ct is the year t per capita
aggregate ¯nal consumption for the group of countries in the regression. The coe±cient
¯C;t measures the average co-movement of the countries' idiosyncratic consumption growth
with their idiosyncratic GDP growth in year t. The smaller the co-movement, the more
consumption is bu®ered against GDP °uctuations. Therefore, this regression provides a
measure of the extent of consumption risk sharing.
3.2 Year-by-year measures of risk sharing: Plot
Figure 1 displays the series of risk sharing measures for EMU and EU countries in order to
see if any \trend" is immediately obvious (the series are smoothed to highlight the trend).
More precisely, we display the estimated values of 100¢(1¡¯K;t) which we interpret as the
percentage of income risk sharing obtained, and 100 ¢ (1 ¡ ¯C;t); which we interpret as the
percentage of consumption risk sharing.
Income risk sharing improved in the late 1990s but has declined in the EMU since then.
S¿rensen, et al. (2007) similarly found an increase in income risk sharing in the late 1990s
while S¿rensen and Yosha (1998) robustly found no income risk sharing before 1990. Our
interpretation is that ¯nancial integration has improved risk sharing over time although
the level of income risk sharing is still quite modest. The decline in the point estimates is
likely \noise"|the low dispersion of output shocks among the EMU countries (\little risk
to share") has the e®ect of making the estimated risk sharing estimates somewhat fragile.
Consumption risk sharing has declined during our sample period. We strongly believe
that this does not re°ect a decline in the ability of EMU citizens to share risk but rather
patterns of consumption preferences that are determined by factors such as, for example,
expectations or ¯nancial innovation that cause consumption growth to deviate from output
growth in the short run. On the other hand, the results do indicate that the level of risk
sharing between EMU countries is far from perfect. The picture for the EU is quite similar,
although the decline in consumption risk sharing is even steeper than for EMU. Estimated
income risk sharing is very similar to that of the EMU countries.
83.3 Panel data regressions: Speci¯cation
We estimate panel data regressions of the form:
¢log GNIit ¡ ¢log GNIt = ¹i + · (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it : (6)
This regression is similar to (4) except that it is now a panel obtained by pooling the years
in the sample. In this speci¯cation, suggested by Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996),
(1¡·) is a scalar that measures the average amount of income risk sharing during the time-
period considered. The coe±cient · measures the average co-movement of the countries'
idiosyncratic GNI-growth with their idiosyncratic GDP-growth over the sample period. The
symbol ¹i indicates the inclusion of a dummy variable for each country|usually referred
to as a country ¯xed e®ect. The inclusion of country ¯xed e®ect is, in OLS regressions,
mathematically equivalent to subtracting the country averages over the sample period for
each variable and then running the regression without a constant. Alternatively, we can
run the regression without country ¯xed e®ects:
¢log GNIit ¡ ¢log GNIt = constant + · (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it : (7)
The di®erence between the two speci¯cations is that the regression with country ¯xed
e®ects has removed the country averages ¢log GNIi: = 1
T §T
t=1¢log GNIit and ¢log GDPi: =
1
T §T
t=1¢log GDPit. If there is high risk sharing at longer intervals (in our samples T would be
six years) then ¢log GNIi: will not be highly correlated with ¢log GDPi:.9 Usually the focus
is on short-term patterns in discussions of risk sharing and we will show results of panel data
regressions that include country ¯xed e®ects.10 In order to highlight the relation between
the time averaged variables, such as ¢log GDPi:, we tabulate their values in Table 1.11
3.3.1 Risk sharing from government versus private saving
We provide measures of the contribution from channels of saving to risk sharing similar to
S¿rensen and Yosha (1998). Consider (real per capita) government saving GSit in country
9Notice that for any variable X, §
T
t=1¢Xt = XT ¡ X1. Therefore, the subtraction of the country ¯xed
e®ects remove the impact of changes from year 1 to year T|in other words, the regression results will
capture only short term changes after country ¯xed e®ects have been included in the panel regression.
10There are several reasons for the focus on shorter frequencies: Risk sharing at longer horizons may be
harder to accomplish, although insurance against long lasting shocks may be more important, or long run
trends in consumption may capture factors such as demographic trends rather than risk.
11One could test for the signi¯cance of the dummy variables but, as we veri¯ed, they are all insigni¯cant
due to the short samples. The important issue is, however, that the inclusion of country ¯xed e®ects changes
the interpretation of the results to short-term risk sharing.
9i at time t. Government and private saving are determined simultaneously, but we may
get an estimate of the contribution to risk sharing from government saving by making the
thought experiment that private saving is zero. In this case consumption is NNDIit ¡ GSit
(where NNDI is net national disposable income). The smoothing of consumption, relative to
income, in this situation is the di®erence between ¢log NNDIit and ¢log(NNDIit¡GSit). We
may then measure the contribution of government saving to risk sharing as the coe±cient
° in the panel data regression
¢log NNDIit ¡ ¢log(NNDIit ¡ GSit) = ¹i + ° (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it : (8)
In this regression, ° directly measures the amount of risk sharing. If government saving
is procyclical NNDIit ¡ GSit will co-vary less with output °uctuations than NNDIit and the
estimated value of ° will be positive, indicating positive risk sharing from government
saving.
Correspondingly, we may run a similar regression substituting private for government
saving to get an estimate of the contribution to risk sharing from private saving.
4 Does higher foreign asset holdings in the EU lead to better
income and consumption risk sharing?
We follow M¶ elitz and Zumer (1999) and S¿rensen et al. (2007) and impose structure on ·.
We allow · to change over time and across countries as follows:
· = ·0 + ·1 t + ·2 (FAit ¡ FA); (9)
where FAit ´ is a measure of foreign assets or liabilities of country i at time t. As a
technical matter, we deduct the mean value of FA because this keeps the interpretation
of ·0 unchanged.12 The term, FA, is generic and may refer to, e.g., total foreign assets
relative to GDP and FA is the average across countries and years. The estimated value
of 1 ¡ ·0 corresponds to the average amount of income risk sharing within the group and
12When FA is not included in the regression, ·0 measures (approximately) the amount of risk sharing for
a country with an average amount of ¯nancial assets. In a regression in which FA is included and FA is
not subtracted, the interpretation of ·0 is the amount of risk sharing for a country with no foreign assets.
Typically, if ^ ·0 is the estimate of ·0 from the former regression and ~ ·0 is the estimate from the latter
regression, one would ¯nd ~ ·0 = ^ ·0 ¡ ^ ·2FA while the estimated value of ·0 will be approximately invariant
when the average has been subtracted from foreign assets. The estimated value of ·2 is mathematically
identical in the two regressions.
101 ¡ ·0 ¡ ·1 t ¡ ·2(FAit ¡ FA) measures the amount of income risk sharing obtained in
period t by country i. We include a time trend in order to guard against the trend in asset
holdings spuriously capturing trend changes in risk sharing that may be caused by other
developments in national economies. In the speci¯cation implied by (6) and (9), the amount
of income risk sharing is allowed to change across countries with foreign asset holdings. The
estimate of ¡·2 measures how much a unit change in FA increases the amount of income
risk sharing obtained.
We will obtain a positive signi¯cant value of ¡·2 if countries that hold more foreign
assets (liabilities) obtain higher risk sharing, but the coe±cient will also be positive if
increasing asset holdings over time have been associated with more risk sharing|in other
words, the interaction term may primarily capture either the trend or country-by-country
di®erences.13 Sometimes we want to ask only if increasing asset holdings over time leads to
higher risk sharing while controlling for average di®erences in asset holdings across countries.
In this case we use the speci¯cation
· = ·0 + ·1 t + ·2 (FAit ¡ FAi:); (10)
where the country-speci¯c averages over time of the interaction term FA have been sub-
tracted. In this speci¯cation the estimate of ·2 re°ects the time series variation in foreign
asset holdings in the average country while di®erences in the level of asset holdings between,
say, Ireland and Germany, will not a®ect the result.
4.1 Data
We use data for GDP (Gross Domestic Product), GNI (Gross National Income), NNDI
(Net National Disposable Income), Government Revenue, Government Expenditure, Popu-
lation, Final Consumption, and Consumer prices from Eurostat. We calculate Government
Saving as Government Revenue minus Government Expenditure. We calculate Private Sav-
ing as the di®erence between Total Saving (NNDI minus Total Final Consumption) and
Government Saving. We calculate the growth rate of per capita real GDP, GNI, and (Fi-
nal) Consumption by calculating per capita values and de°ating all series by the Consumer
Price Index of the corresponding country. We obtain portfolio equity and debt holdings
by issuing country from the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys. These data
record which foreign countries a country in the sample have invested in. These surveys were
13The year-by-year risk sharing regressions re°ect on the time series pattern and are not a®ected by
average di®erence between countries.
11conducted using consistent guidelines for measuring security holdings across countries and
the data are likely to be of high quality. The surveys were conducted for investor coun-
tries, including most OECD countries. Aggregate foreign equity, debt, and foreign direct
investment (FDI) asset and liability data can be obtained from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007). Data on banking integration are from the databases Bankscope and Zephyr, both
published by Bureau van Dijk.
5 Empirical ¯ndings: Portfolio holdings
In order to get an impression of growth-patterns by country, we display in Table 1 the
average growth rates of output, gross national income, and consumption for each country
for the sub-samples 1995-1999 and 2000-2006 surrounding the year of the introduction of
the euro. The long-term EU-countries such as France, Germany, and Italy have been among
the slowest growing countries during the 1995-2006 period while less developed economies
such as Estonia and Slovenia have been fast growing. Ireland had such high growth in the
1990s that its output now is clearly above the EU average even if it started below the EU
average. As Ireland has reached the level of development of the older EU-countries, growth
has slowed down while the growth rates of Estonia and Latvia have accelerated into the
double digits after the turn of the millennium. If there is signi¯cant risk sharing at the
5-6 year horizon the county-by-country consumption growth rates would not very similar
to output growth rates. One quick glance at the table reveals that risk sharing is still
very low among the EU countries at the 5-year frequency: Ireland and Estonia have rapid
consumption growth and Germany has low consumption growth and those average growth
rates are very similar to the output growth rates of the respective countries. Maybe there
is more risk sharing at higher frequencies and we turn to that question next.
5.1 Panel data regressions: Risk sharing among EMU and EU countries
Table 2 shows the results of panel risk sharing regressions for the years 1995{1999 and
2000{2006 for di®erent groups of EU countries. In particular, we estimate the degree of
risk sharing among EMU member countries in columns (1) and (2), \old" EU countries in
columns (3) and (4), \new" EU countries in columns (5) and (6), and all EU countries in
columns (7) and (8), for each of the two subperiods. The table displays results for both
income and consumption risk sharing. The results are presented with country ¯xed e®ects
(country dummy variables).
12Considering ¯rst income risk sharing among the group of EMU countries, we ¯nd no
risk sharing in the early (1995-1999) sample but 15.7 percent risk sharing in the 2000-2006
sample.14 For the larger group of long-standing EU countries, columns (3) and (4), income
risk sharing has declined in the new millennium. We believe that the underlying amount
of income insurance may be increasing but that temporary e®ects, in particular recessions,
can skew the numbers. However, the larger decline in income risk sharing for this group of
countries, compared to the EMU group, strongly suggests that ¯nancial integration within
the EMU has facilitated risk sharing. The new EU countries display positive and increasing
income risk sharing. For the full group of EU countries income risk sharing is positive and
statistically signi¯cant|partly due to lower standard errors that results from the larger
sample.15
Consider consumption risk sharing.16 Consumption risk sharing in the EMU is 42.3
percent in the early sample and 52.9 percent in the late sample. Consumption smoothing
for the old EU group is similar in 1995-1999 but declined a little for 2000-2006 but these
di®erences are not signi¯cant. Consumption risk sharing among the group of new EU
countries is very low. Possibly this is due to ¯nancial developments making credit more
available than in the past and if this results in a consumption surge in some of these countries
simultaneously with a surge in output, we will estimate low consumption smoothing. The
estimates for 2000{2006 are even lower than income risk sharing, implying that saving
didn't contribute to risk sharing at all. Consumption risk sharing for the full group of EU
countries is almost as low as for the new EU group.
Overall, the estimates are somewhat noisy. This is to be expected when using short
samples, but there is little doubt that income risk sharing is currently positive while it
was close to zero in the early 1990s. We believe this is a result of ¯nancial globalization
which is partly caused by EU integration and the formation of the EMU. However, the data
do not indicate any sudden sharp break at the time the common currency was introduced.
14S¿rensen and Yosha (1998) robustly found no income risk sharing between EU (and OECD) countries in
the 1970s or 1980s. In their regressions Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom comprised \the EU." For the EU-countries they found consumption risk sharing
of 43 percent during 1966-1980 and 22 percent during the 1980s. They did not include country dummies in
their regressions.
15The risk sharing estimate for the full groups of EU countries does not equal the average of the estimated
risk sharing for the sub-groups although it may often be close. The estimate for the full groups is partly
driven by the amount of risk sharing between the group of old EU countries and the group of new EU
countries. For example, if there is high risk sharing within these two groups but low risk sharing between
the groups, the estimate for the full group will be below both of the within-group estimates.
16Some authors, such as S¿rensen and Yosha (1998), de¯ne consumption smoothing to re°ect whether
consumption is \smoother" than disposable income while consumption smoothing here captures risk sharing
from all sources including income smoothing. This choice is mainly one of exposition.
13Income risk sharing is mainly a result of countries owning assets in other countries and very
large amount of international assets is needed to signi¯cantly smooth income. From casual
observation it appears that the amount of foreign owned businesses in, say, Germany, are
much below the amount of out-of-state asset holdings of typical U.S. states. Therefore, we
do not ¯nd it surprising that income risk sharing in Europe is much below that found for
the United States by Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996). Further, ¯nancial integration
has harmonized interest rates on safe bonds and international trade in such bonds are now
unlikely to provide substantial intra-EMU risk sharing. Overall, we ¯nd that procyclical
saving is not smoothing consumption much, particularly in the new EU countries. We
will brie°y consider the contributions to risk sharing from government and private saving,
respectively, in order to explore if this ¯nding is due to government ¯scal policy.
5.2 The role of government and private saving
Table 3 displays the amount of consumption smoothing due to saving. If saving is procyclical
this will help smooth consumption. The results for EMU countries reveal quite erratic
patterns of smoothing from saving.17 In the EMU private saving dis-smooth consumption
in the early sample while procyclical government saving helped smooth consumption. In the
late sample this pattern is reversed. For the larger EU sample a more systematic pattern
is visible. Private saving has contributed signi¯cantly at about 35 percent to consumption
smoothing while government saving contributed little at 8 percent (but not signi¯cant at
the 10 percent level) to consumption smoothing in the early sample and not at all in
the late sample. In the new EU countries private saving has been countercyclical making
consumption more volatile than income.18 Considering all EU countries together, there
has been little contribution to consumption smoothing from either government or private
saving. The sum of the contributions from government or private saving do not exactly
add up to the di®erence between income and consumption smoothing in the previous table
but the message of these tables are the same: Procyclical saving has not played a large
role in consumption smoothing in the EU since 1995. Possibly, this is pattern of saving is
perfectly rational according to permanent income theory but it will take us much to far
a¯eld to answer that question.
17Of course, our results do not reveal if, say, the levels of government saving are optimal or in-optimal in
any sense.
18Recall, that our risk sharing regressions are impacted only by country-speci¯c patterns, so in the con-
ventional sense private saving may or may not have been procyclical.
145.3 Foreign asset and liabilities
The simplest measure of the relative importance of foreign asset holdings is the amount
of gross assets relative to GDP. We calculate this measure for portfolio equity and debt
(bonds). In Table 4, we show foreign equity, debt, and FDI holdings for the years 1995
and 2004 (the last year for which we have data). Equity and debt holdings vary consid-
erably across countries; Ireland holds signi¯cantly more assets relative to GDP than most
other countries and Luxembourg has a character of an outlier. A trend toward increased
diversi¯cation is clearly visible. If we take Ireland as an example of a very open economy
with signi¯cant risk sharing, it is clear from the table that even though most countries have
increased their holdings of international assets signi¯cantly they still seem too small for
signi¯cant income smoothing. Another way of thinking of this is as follows. If a country
has net foreign assets and liabilities in the order of GDP, then if the return on assets is one
percent higher than the return on liabilities this results in net earnings from international
assets equal to one percent of GDP. If this happens in a years where GDP growth is 1 per-
cent below the average of the EU, the asset income will have smoothed income perfectly.
We suspect a return di®erence of a full percent is hard to come by, at least for debt, and
return di®erences will not always have the right sign (such as to provide smoothing) relative
to output. It is our conjecture that gross asset holdings need to be in an order of 10 times
GDP (which is about the level found for Ireland) to provide the level of income smoothing
found between U.S. states. This is admittedly a crude calibration but our reading of Ta-
ble 4 is nonetheless that most EMU countries still have some way to go before the level of
¯nancial integration found between U.S. states is achieved.
We examine if risk sharing is correlated di®erently with the amount invested in EMU
countries (where returns are likely to more similar) than with assets invested in other
countries.19 In Table 5, we show how large a fraction of foreign assets EU countries have
invested in other EMU and EU countries, respectively. Most EU countries invest the
majority of their foreign equity in EMU countries (with the Netherlands and Malta as
notable exceptions). On average, EMU equity holdings have increased, although mainly in
non-EMU EU countries, perhaps because the euro has lowered trading costs. There has also
been an increase in the amount of EU-country equity held by EU countries, but it appears
that this increase is no larger than the increase found for EMU-country equity. Overall,
the equity investment of EU countries is overwhelmingly (about 60 percent) invested in EU
19The data that allow us to make this breakdown are from the IMF's coordinated portfolio survey which
does not have good liability data and this source does not give numbers for FDI.
15countries. A similar pattern applies to investments in debt securities. An increase in EMU
country debt and an even stronger bias toward EU debt can also be observed.
5.4 Foreign asset holdings and risk sharing
Table 6 considers if higher amounts of foreign assets are associated with more income risk
sharing. The interpretation of the interaction coe±cient is the increase in risk sharing that
would result from an increase in foreign asset holdings equal to GDP. Because holdings
of, say, equity and debt tend to be highly correlated, with some countries holding large
amounts of each while other countries hold few foreign assets of either kind, the results are
somewhat tentative.20 The results for the EMU and the EU are similar, although the EMU
results have higher standard errors and some of the coe±cients appear noisy. Most of the
interaction coe±cients are not signi¯cant but the interaction terms with asset holdings are
all positive which is a strong indicator that there really is a positive e®ect. The coe±cients
to assets (whether debt or equity) invested outside the EMU are signi¯cant which indicates
that such assets may have returns that are less correlated with the output of the investor
countries and therefore are better able to smooth income.
Table 7 displays results for consumption risk sharing from regressions similar to those
of the previous table. The results of these regressions reveal a negative association of asset
holdings with risk sharing. A decrease in consumption smoothing has occurred during
this period where asset holdings have been increasing. We do not believe that this ¯nding
re°ects that countries which increase foreign asset holdings become more exposed to output
risk|while a full investigation of this issue is beyond the scope of this study, we think that
easier access to credit may have lead to high growth of output and consumption in certain
countries. This implies that risk sharing is far from perfect but probably not that risk
sharing has declined in a deeper sense.
In Table 8 the coe±cient to risk sharing is a function of equity, bond, and FDI holdings
and liabilities. The results do not appear noisy and the coe±cient estimates are quite
similar for the EMU and the full EU. The coe±cients to all assets and liabilities are positive
and signi¯cant; however, the asset holdings are so correlated that the coe±cient to bonds
may be positive not because bond holdings are e±cient for risk sharing but because bond
holding are correlated with, say, FDI holdings. The estimated coe±cients are largest for
debt assets as well as liabilities. We doubt that this is due to returns to, for example, debt
20If the sample was substantially larger, we could include interaction terms for equity and debt invested
in EMU, EU, and rest-of-the-world in one multiple regression and get a cleaner picture of the relative
importance of each term.
16assets being more correlated with output. We do not attempt to trace out the mechanisms
underlying the results but we point out the underlying mechanisms can be quite indirect.
For example, if the government of a country aggressively borrows abroad by issuing bonds
during recessions, we will see debt correlated with risk sharing. Or the amount of corporate
debt may re°ect structural di®erences between economies.
Table 9 reports on estimates of consumption risk sharing for speci¯cations similar to
those of the previous table. Most coe±cients are insigni¯cant indicating that the risk
sharing e®ects of saving adds a level of noise to our income based regressions. Only the
coe±cient of interaction with debt holdings is signi¯cant. This may re°ect the results of
the previous tables or it could re°ect that countries with high saving rates hold more debt
assets and ¯nd it easier to smooth consumption.
Overall, higher stocks of international assets help smooth income and assets held outside
the EMU seem to provide better risk sharing per euro invested. Our short samples do not
really warrant any further conclusions.
6 Integration of European banking markets through consol-
idation and foreign entry
An analysis of the impact of European banking market integration on risk sharing may be
approached in a similar fashion to the analysis above, investigating the smoothing of income
and consumption from the part of net foreign income resulting from bank loans and bank
sector FDI. Banks, however, may facilitate risk sharing through channels not considered
above. In the following, we therefore use the approach of Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and
S¿rensen (2007a,b) to analyze these questions. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and S¿rensen have
recently showed that deregulation and integration of individual U.S. states' banking markets
have entailed welfare gains for, especially, small business owners whose personal income has
been smoothed considerably.
Banking integration may smooth households' personal income relative to output °uctu-
ations, i.e., income risk sharing, by increasing the availability of loans to households or by
altering the lending pattern of banks. For illustration, consider an owner of a small business
that is entirely self-¯nanced (a sole proprietorship). In this case, the small business owner
bears all the ¯rm's output risk himself/herself|shocks to the surplus created in the ¯rm will
be transferred one-to-one to his or her personal income. When the owner obtains external
¯nance, the linkage between his or her personal ¯nances and those of the business is relaxed
17and the covariation of personal income with output may fall. Banks may share risk with
the owner by avoiding initiation of formal bankruptcy procedures and liquidation of assets
when the business hits hard times, allowing the borrower to fall behind with payments of
interest and installments, and renegotiating loan contracts. When businesses default, banks
share risk by absorbing part of the losses. Furthermore, the availability of external ¯nance
may help small business owners smooth their income to the extent it furthers diversi¯ca-
tion of the owners' sources of income. It may facilitate accumulation of assets outside the
business, e.g., in domestic or foreign ¯nancial investments, generating a stream of future
income that is less than perfectly correlated with the success of the business.
In the beginning of the 1980s, U.S. banking markets were heavily regulated at the state
level: Most states did not allow entry by banks from other states and several states did not
permit in-state banks to set up state-wide branch networks. During the 1980s and 1990s,
however, most states eliminated these restrictions and two waves of bank mergers and
acquisitions ensued. The ¯rst wave entailed consolidation within states, the second entailed
consolidation across state borders. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and S¿rensen show that the
percentage of states' output shocks smoothed, and therefore not passed on to personal
income, increased by twenty percentage points for the group of states with most small
businesses. For the average state, the e®ect of banking deregulation was in the order of ten
percentage points.21 An important conclusion of Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and S¿rensen is
that both consolidation within markets (domestic consolidation) and consolidation between
markets (cross-border consolidation) are associated with improvements in risk sharing.
Fundamentally, banks' ability to share risk is determined by their ability to assume
and bear risk on their balance sheets.22 The better banks may withstand economic shocks,
the less those shocks will be passed on to their borrowers. It follows directly that a bank
that expands operations into new markets, either through direct cross-border lending or by
establishing foreign subsidiaries or branches, may improve the geographical diversi¯cation
of its loan portfolio and lower its susceptibility to national business cycle °uctuations.
Hence, cross-border lending and investments in banking markets may improve risk sharing
through net factor income in a manner similar to debt and FDI, as discussed in Section 2,
but also because diversi¯cation of banks' asset portfolios may improve their consolidated
risk-return tradeo® and smooth revenues, which, in turn, may impact banks' ability to bear
21Further evidence is provided by Demyanyk (2005, 2008) who shows that income growth rates improved
among self-employed following U.S. banking deregulations.
22Of course, banks may alternatively pass assumed risk on to third parties through securitization or loan
sales, in which case the banks do not bear the risks on their balance sheets, but facilitates risk sharing as
intermediaries.
18risk and their pattern of lending.23
It may be less obvious that also within-market consolidation may improve risk sharing.
Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and S¿rensen argue that this e®ect works through two main chan-
nels. The ¯rst channel is wholesale banking markets. Small banks are typically without
access to wholesale money and interbank markets due to informational frictions.24 From
an EU perspective, therefore, domestic bank consolidation may give more banks access to
international wholesale markets where banks and other ¯nancial institutions share risk with
each other. That is, risk sharing between banks themselves may improve. For example, a
bank operating in a particular country may avoid terminating borrowers' loan contracts by
borrowing in wholesale markets in the face of adverse country-speci¯c shocks. This channel,
hence, works through interbank international (cross-border) borrowing and lending.
The second channel is competition in retail banking markets. Outside entry, or the
threat of outside entry, may improve the average e±ciency of banks, either through ef-
¯ciency improvements among incumbent banks or because more e±cient entrant banks
drive incumbent banks out of business. Banks with superior screening or monitoring of
customers, or ¯nancially less constrained banks, have more ¯nancial \slack" and therefore
more leeway for sharing risk with their borrowers. Hence, intensi¯ed competition may not
just lead to more competitive pricing, but also to improved risk sharing.
Assessing the integration of banking markets is important because small and medium
enterprizes (SME) are heavily dependent on bank ¯nance. Small ¯rms do not typically have
access to corporate bond or equity markets, and integration of these European securities
markets, therefore, do not necessarily bene¯t this group of ¯rms. SMEs are important cata-
lysts in the economy|much new innovation and job creation takes place in small businesses.
However, small ¯rms' investment is especially vulnerable to business cycle °uctuations and
the extent to which banks are willing and able to bear borrowers' risk may therefore have
important implication for economic growth and the welfare of entrepreneurs.
When we consider the existing empirical evidence of the integration of European whole-
sale and retail banking markets, respectively, the conclusion is generally that wholesale
markets are strongly integrated but the retail markets are much less so. Baele et al. (2004)
quantify the evolution of market integration after the introduction of the euro and ¯nd that
repo and unsecured money markets are close to perfectly integrated. Barros et al. (2005)
report that the European interbank market is two-tiered: Large domestic banks hold po-
23Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) demonstrate that U.S. bank holding companies manage capital and
liquidity at the consolidated level.
24See Kashyap and Stein (2001).
19sitions against foreign banks and reallocate funding to smaller national banks. Hence, if
domestic banking consolidation, through the creation of larger banks, have improved banks'
(direct and indirect) access to well-functioning pan-European wholesale markets, EU-wide
risk sharing may have improved as a consequence.
On the other hand, considering retail banking markets, several studies have pointed to
an apparent lack of integration. Loan interest rates di®er considerably between European
countries, and while the cross-country dispersion of loan rates has decreased during the
1990s, it is still considerable, especially in the market for consumer and short-term business
loans (Baele et al. (2004), and Gual (2004)). This seems to suggest that competition
between regional banking markets is still relatively limited. Also, banks hold only a fraction
of their assets and liabilities|typically 5{10 percent|directly against non-resident non-
bank counterparties (Barros et al. (2005), Dermine (2005)). Direct cross-border banking
transactions are relatively small in magnitude. Buch, Driscoll, and Ostergaard (2006)
show that banks' asset portfolios are excessively (when considering potential gains from
international diversi¯cation) tilted toward domestic assets. Dermine (2005) argues that to
the extent ¯nancial services are non-tradable, it is unlikely that one should observe a lot
of direct cross-border banking, especially when considering small business ¯nance. Small
business lending is heavily dependent on subjective (soft) information about borrowers,
information that banks can not collect without geographical proximity to their borrowers.
We should therefore expect integration to be achieved through cross-border investment,
that is, through foreign bank entry, rather than cross-border banking.
Currently, entry by foreign banks has been limited in many European countries but a
substantial consolidation among domestic banks has occurred in many of the \old" EU-
member countries. In the period up to the introduction of the euro, around 60 percent of
all mergers and acquisitions in Europe took place in domestic markets (Buch and DeLong
(2004), Table 1) with only a few signi¯cant cross-border deals.25 Political opposition and
merger control legislation may be other factors that explain the relative absence of foreign
bank acquisitions (Carletti, Hartmann, and Ongena (2007)). Recently, however, cross-
border mergers seem to be gaining some momentum.26
25The latter included the Dutch ING Group, the pan-Scandinavian Nordea Bank, and the German Hypo
Vereinsbank, see Dermine (2005).
26It is often proposed that banking consolidation may sever bank relationships and harm small borrowers,
suggesting that small business owners will be harmed from integration. For example, Degryse, Masschelein,
and Mitchell (2006) ¯nd that commercial borrowers of target banks in Belgian mergers and acquisitions are
more likely to discontinue a bank relationship than borrowers of non-merging banks, and that this e®ect is
larger for small than for large ¯rms. A related concern is that bank competition may be harmful to bank-
borrower relationships by limiting the sustainability of implicit contracts and the sharing of intertemporal
20The picture is turned upside down, however, when one considers the transitional economies
among the group of new countries that joined the EU in 2004. Foreign banks are pervasively
present in many of these countries as a result of the transition to market-based economies,
and in several countries foreign-owned banks dominate the market completely. Giannetti
and Ongena (2007) demonstrate that foreign bank lending in transitional economies has
been associated with considerable positive growth e®ects for SMEs.27
6.1 Does integration in banking markets predict better income and con-
sumption risk sharing?
We investigate the e®ect of domestic and cross-border consolidation in banking markets on
risk sharing using the approach outlined in Section 3. That is, we estimate the regression
(6), reproduced below, including an interaction e®ect for di®erent measures of banking
integration in country i, date t, generically denoted INTit.
¢log GNIit ¡ ¢log GNIt = ¹i + · (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it ;
· = ·0 + ·1 t + ·2 (INTit¡INT); (11)
where 1 ¡ · is the measure of risk sharing.
Because the institutional structure of ¯nancial markets may vary considerably between
the countries in the sample, we also run regressions that remove country-speci¯c consolida-
tion e®ects by subtracting out a country's average level of consolidation of the interaction
e®ect, INTi:. This speci¯cation essentially removes permanent di®erences between coun-
tries in the level of consolidation and the resulting regression captures the e®ect of the
time-variation in banking consolidation on income and consumption risk sharing.
· = ·0 + ·1 t + ·2 (INTit ¡INTi:): (12)
Permanent di®erences in ¯nancial structure are evident if we compare the groups of old
and new member countries. For new member countries, the pre-transitional banking sectors
have been completely transformed, but ¯nancial markets and institutions are overall still
surplus between borrowers and lenders (Petersen and Rajan (1995)). The e®ect of European banking
consolidation, therefore, must be assessed empirically. The analysis of Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and S¿rensen
(2007b) shows that, in the United States, such detrimental e®ects are far outweighed by bene¯cial ¯rst order
e®ects on risk sharing. In particular, they ¯nd that the largest e®ect on risk sharing comes from deregulations
that eliminate local monopoly markets for community banks.
27See also Focarelli and Pozzolo (2006).
21less developed compared to old member countries. Hence, if new member countries tend
to experience relatively less risk sharing but a relatively higher degree of consolidation, the
outcome of regressions that do not control for permanent di®erences in banking consolida-
tion are likely to estimate a lower overall e®ect of banking consolidation on risk sharing.
Permanent di®erences in structure also exist among the group of old member countries, es-
pecially Belgium stands out by having experienced a considerably higher degree of foreign
bank entry than the average country.
6.2 Data and measures of banking integration
Cross-border ownership
We ¯rst measure banking integration as cross-border bank ownership. In particular, we
compute the proportion of bank assets (or loans) in country i that are owned by institutions
registered in another EU country. (This measure is akin to the FDI liability measure, FDIF,
in equation (2)). The proportion of foreign ownership of a given bank is de¯ned as the the
product of foreign owners' equity stake, measured in percent, and the value of total assets
(loans) of the bank, provided that the foreign holders' equity stake is at least 50 percent. The
proportion of foreign ownership of bank assets (loans) in a given country is then summarized
over all banks and divided by the value of aggregate bank assets (loans) in that country.
This measure of integration will vary over time and is sensitive to the organizational form
of banks with foreign ownership, i.e., this measure will not capture foreign entry if it occurs
by the formation of bank branches. Preliminary investigations (not shown), suggest that
these ownership measures are quite noisy and may vary considerably from year to year for
a given country.
Data of foreign ownership is available from Bankscope published by Bureau van Dijk.
Banks considered are commercial, savings, and cooperative banks.
Cumulative acquired bank assets in domestic and foreign M&A deals
As a second measure of banking integration, we consider the cumulated (real) value of
bank assets in country i that were acquired in domestic, respectively foreign, merger and
acquisition (M&A) deals from the beginning of the sample up to and including year t.28
We scale this measure by the (real) value of aggregate bank assets in country i in year t. In
a given country, this measure will be increasing over time to the extent that consolidation
28In the regressions, we take logarithms and rescale the measure as log(1 +INTit*100)*1000 to eliminate
the in°uence of outliers (we take the log of \one plus INTit" because the cumulative acquired value of bank
assets for a given country may equal zero in some years). Multiplication by 1000 is for the purpose of
rescaling the parameter estimates and does not a®ect statical signi¯cance.
22occurs faster than asset growth of the banking industry. The cumulative nature of the
measure gives it \memory" of the intensity of past acquisitions during the sample, that is,
the measure will not display a drop in value if years with high M&A activity are followed
by years with little activity.
Data on M&A deals between banks are from Zephyr, published by Bureau van Dijk,
and country-level total bank assets are from Bankscope. We only consider deals involving
banks from EU member countries, that is, acquisitions from banks located outside of the
EU area are not included in our measures. Also, we only consider deals where the acquired
stake is at least 50 percent. We de¯ne \domestic (foreign) M&A deals" as completed deals
where the target and the bidding bank are registered in the same (di®erent) countries. In
the cases with multiple acquiring banks, a deal is considered \foreign" if at least one of the
acquiring banks is registered in a country di®erent from the target.
6.3 Empirical ¯ndings: Banking consolidation
Figure 2 displays foreign ownership as a fraction of aggregate bank assets in 2000 and
2006 for each country, grouped into \old" and \new" EU countries respectively. It is
evident that foreign ownership is much more pervasive in the new member countries, and
that in some countries, especially the Baltic countries, foreign owned banks dominate the
market completely. The dramatic change in the structure of eastern European banking
markets during transition is evidenced by a comparison of foreign ownership in 2000 and
2006. In contrast, foreign ownership of bank assets is much lower in the western European
longstanding member countries, with Finland being the exception due to the strong market
position of the pan-Scandinavian bank Nordea.29
Figure 3 displays the total number of domestic and foreign M&A deals ¯nalized during
our sample period and Figure 4 shows the cumulative value of acquired bank assets over
the sample. Not only is the number of acquisitions in the old EU countries higher, the deals
also involve larger target banks, compared to deals involving new EU target banks. Fur-
thermore, it is evident that domestic consolidation is much more pronounced than foreign
acquisitions in the old EU member countries. In new member countries, relatively more of
the deals involve entry by a foreign bank. It is also clear from the ¯gures that the degree
of consolidation is uneven across the di®erent countries, even when taking into account the
29Because Nordea is registered in Sweden, our measure of foreign penetration of the Swedish market is
essentially nil. This observation also reveals a de¯ciency of the use of foreign ownership as a measure of
bank integration. However, since the measure of foreign ownership turns out to have no estimated e®ect on
risk sharing in the regressions, as we show below, we do not pursue modi¯cations of this measure further.
23di®erent size of the economies.
Table 10 shows the results from income and consumption risk sharing regressions, equa-
tion (11), measuring banking market integration as the proportion of foreign ownership.
First notice that the overall levels of income and consumption risk sharing are of a similar
order of magnitude as those reported in Table 2, although the level of income insurance
is generally insigni¯cant (the relatively large standard errors are due to the small sample
sizes). Foreign ownership is negatively associated with income risk sharing in the EMU
and old EU group, but insigni¯cant for the other groups, whether measured as a fraction
of aggregate bank assets or loans. This may imply that foreign entry has been associated
with tighter credit conditions, but the negative coe±cient may also re°ect permanent dif-
ferences in the level of foreign ownership among the longstanding EU countries. The e®ect
on consumption risk sharing is generally insigni¯cant.
In Table 11 we control for permanent di®erences in ownership structures and the esti-
mated coe±cients on foreign ownership are now all insigni¯cant. The e®ect on consumption
risk sharing is again generally insigni¯cant, except in one instance for the all EU group.
In both tables the results appear quite noisy and we believe this may be due to the small
sample sizes and to \noise" in the measure of foreign ownership: Foreign ownership varies
considerably from country to country and the very large foreign ownership shares in some
countries, such as Estonia and Latvia, are not randomly distributed but concentrated in
countries that experience dramatic changes in their economies|these changes may swamp
any e®ects on risk sharing from banking integration. We turn to our second measure of bank
integration and do not pursue any further analysis with the measure of foreign ownership.
Table 12 shows the results from risk sharing regressions where market integration is
measured as cumulative acquired bank assets in all deals (i.e., both foreign and domestic
deals). The e®ect of banking consolidation on income insurance is generally not signi¯cant.
Banking consolidation, however, tends to be associated with negative consumption risk
sharing, that is, consolidation over the sample period has been associated with an increase
in the procyclicality of consumption, consistent with the overall decline in consumption
smoothing during the 2000-2006 period. The negative association between consumption risk
sharing and banking consolidation most likely re°ects temporary consumption shocks that
have occurred simultaneously with banking consolidation, similarly to the e®ect observed
in Table 7.
In Table 13, we report the results of separate regressions for domestic and foreign con-
solidation. The results for domestic consolidation are similar to those of Table 12, although
foreign entry appears to be associated with negative income smoothing in the group of
24new EU countries. If foreign bank entry in transitional countries causes ¯nance to be cut
for some borrowers, for example because foreign banks apply more sophisticated screen-
ing methods or because foreign banks squeeze domestic banks out of the market and cut
lending to informationally opaque borrowers, the e®ect on income risk sharing may well be
negative.30 Consumption risk sharing is also a®ected negatively by banking consolidation,
especially in the case of foreign deals. The exception is the group of EMU countries where
domestic consolidation is associated with consumption smoothing. There appears to be an
asymmetry between domestic and foreign deals for the groups of old and new EU countries:
For old member countries, foreign entry tends to dis-smooth consumption, for new member
countries, domestic consolidation tends to dis-smoth consumption.
Tables 14 and 15 display the results from risk sharing regressions (12) that control for
di®erences in the level of banking consolidation across countries. Considering ¯rst the e®ect
of overall consolidation, Table 14, we observe a positive impact on income risk sharing for
all subgroups of countries. The estimated coe±cient is signi¯cant at the 10 percent level
for the EMU and old EU groups, but insigni¯cant for the new and all EU groups. The
e®ect of consolidation on consumption risk sharing is insigni¯cant for all groups.
Splitting the regressions into domestic and foreign deals, Table 15, it is clear that domes-
tic consolidation has a relatively large, positively signi¯cant, e®ect on income smoothing,
especially for EMU and old EU member countries, whereas foreign consolidation has no
signi¯cant e®ect. The bottom part of the table recon¯rms that neither domestic or foreign
consolidation has systematic e®ects on consumption risk sharing (although the estimated
coe±cient is signi¯cantly negative for the all EU group).
Overall, our results indicate that the process of banking consolidation after 2000, has
been associated with an improvement in income risk sharing, in particular within the EMU
and longstanding EU countries. The results suggest that consolidation may be associated
with positive welfare e®ects and are consistent with the results of Demyanyk, Ostergaard,
and S¿rensen (2007a,b), who ¯nd bene¯cial e®ect for especially small business owners|in
the present paper, however, we stop short of estimating the e®ect on small businesses. Our
¯ndings con¯rm our conjecture and ¯nding from the United States that within-country con-
solidation may be equally important for banking integration as cross-border consolidation.
Although the improvement in risk sharing that we estimate is associated only with domestic
consolidation, we believe that foreign bank entry in EU markets is likely to have similar
e®ects. The lack of results for foreign mergers and acquisitions is probably caused by the
30Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2006) argue that foreign banks in poor countries supply less credit
and hold less risky loan portfolios, i.e., that foreign banks are less willing to bear risk.
25short time series|there is simply too little foreign entry early in the sample to identify an
e®ect.
7 Conclusion
We investigate whether risk sharing between EMU and EU member countries have increased
since the adoption of the euro. We document that overall income risk sharing has been
higher in the ¯ve years following the introduction of the euro than during the previous ¯ve
year period, and that the improvement has been highest for the group of EMU members.
In the same period, however, overall consumption risk sharing has decreased except among
EMU members. Our results imply that ¯nancial integration between the EMU countries,
and ¯nancial globalization in general, has facilitated the smoothing of income. We sug-
gest that temporary shifts in consumption in response to, e.g., taste shocks or increased
availability of credit, is responsible for the dis-smoothing of consumption.
We further show that international portfolio diversi¯cation has increased for both EU
and EMU members. We ¯nd evidence that increased holdings of foreign assets have been
associated with increased income risk sharing. The estimates are somewhat imprecise, and
may re°ect that signi¯cant international integration of asset markets is very recent and still
on-going. The e®ect of diversi¯cation on risk sharing is approximately similar whether one
considers assets held against foreign residents (domestic assets), or foreigners' assets hold-
ings against domestic residents (domestic liabilities). Our results show, however, that assets
and liabilities invested outside the EU (EMU) have the largest e®ect on risk sharing per
euro invested, which indicates that such securities may have returns that are less correlated
with the output of the EU (EMU) countries and therefore better able to smooth income.
Increasing international asset holdings are associated with declining consumption risk shar-
ing. We believe that these are transitory patterns due to, for example, simultaneously high
consumption growth and improved availability of credit in some countries.
Finally, we investigate the e®ect of banking market integration on risk sharing. We
¯nd that income risk sharing has improved following domestic banking consolidation when
we focus on country-speci¯c trends in consolidation. Hence, the countries with a higher
average level of banking consolidation do not on average obtain more risk sharing. We do
not ¯nd any evidence of a similar e®ect from foreign banking consolidation, but we believe
that too little foreign consolidation has yet occurred that one may identify such an e®ect.
Overall, our results leave little doubt that the process of ¯nancial integration among
26EMU countries has been associated with bene¯cial welfare e®ects, in particular in the form
of improved smoothing of income. Financial integration, however, is progressing only slowly
and the overall level of integration is still lagging behind the level of integration between
U.S. states where cross-state investment and securities holdings are much more pervasive.
The removal of formal barriers to diversi¯cation of assets and removal of obstacles to cross-
border banking integration will help. However, individuals' desire to invest in international
assets may also be depend on non-regulatory factors such as the degree to which they trust
foreign individuals and institutions. Ekinci, Kalemli-Ozcan, and S¿rensen (2008) show
that \social capital" variables explain patterns of risk sharing within EU countries|such
variables may prove harder to change than formal economic barriers to integration.
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31Table 1:
Country-level growth rates of real GDP, GNI, and Consumption per capita.
Country GDP GNI CONS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
95{99 00{06 95{99 00{06 95{99 00{06
Austria 2.0 1.2 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.9
Belgium 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.7
Bulgaria {3.1 5.2 n.a. 5.3 {2.5 4.9
Cyprus 2.0 2.1 1.7 2.2 3.0 2.5
Czech 1.6 3.9 1.1 3.4 2.4 3.1
Denmark 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.3 1.4 1.7
Estonia 6.6 10.0 6.2 9.5 5.8 8.1
Finland 4.8 2.6 5.3 2.9 3.5 3.0
France 2.0 1.5 2.3 1.3 1.4 1.8
Germany 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.2
Greece 2.9 4.0 2.6 4.0 2.2 3.7
Hungary 2.7 4.8 2.2 4.6 1.6 5.3
Ireland 10.6 3.9 9.4 3.9 7.4 3.7
Italy 1.9 1.1 2.2 1.1 2.5 1.4
Latvia 5.7 10.4 5.3 10.1 5.3 9.8
Lithuania 4.7 8.3 4.1 8.3 4.7 7.5
Luxembourg 4.4 4.2 3.6 2.9 3.3 2.7
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 3.3 1.8 3.2 1.9 3.1 1.8
Poland 4.4 3.3 4.6 2.9 4.9 3.3
Portugal 4.4 0.8 4.1 0.6 4.2 1.4
Romania n.a. 8.5 n.a. 8.3 n.a. 8.4
Slovak 2.2 3.3 1.9 3.1 3.3 3.2
Slovenia 4.5 3.4 4.4 3.2 3.8 2.6
Spain 3.8 3.0 3.7 2.9 3.3 2.8
Sweden 3.6 2.6 3.9 2.8 3.6 2.2
UK 3.0 2.1 3.0 2.3 3.1 2.5
Note: The rows display the average values of (real, per capita) GDP, GNI, and Consumption growth rates
over the 1995-1999 period, see columns (1), (3), and (5) and over the 2000-2006 period, see columns (2),
(4), and 6) for each of the EU-27 countries. Data source: Eurostat (1994{2006).
32Table 2:
Income and Consumption Smoothing among
EMU, Old, New, and All EU member countries.
EMU OLD EU NEW EU ALL EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)



















(10.6) (7.1) (5.6) (5.3) (8.7) (6.4) (3.7) (4.8)
Note: The table reports the average amount of risk sharing during the time-period considered among the
countries included in the sample. The numbers are calculated as 1¡^ · where the ^ · coe±cients are estimates
from GLS regressions of the form ¢log GNIit ¡ ¢log GNIt = ¹i + ·(¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it, where
¹i are country ¯xed-e®ects (for income risk sharing). Consumption risk sharing regressions are estimated
in a similar manner with GNIit replaced by consumption growth. Columns (1) and (2) use a subsample
of EMU countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain for the time periods of 1995-1999 and 2000-2006, respectively. Columns (3) and (4)
use a subsample of old EU countries consisting of the EMU countries plus Denmark, Sweden, and the UK
for the time periods of 1995-1999 and 2000-2006, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) use a subsample of
new EU countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia for the time periods of 1995-1999 and 2000-2006, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) include all of
the above countries in the sample for the time periods of 1995-1999 and 2000-2006, respectively. Numbers
in parentheses are standard errors.
¤¤¤,
¤¤, and
¤ indicate statistical signi¯cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
33Table 3:
Risk Sharing via Private and Government Saving among EU countries:
EMU, Old, New, and All EU member countries.
EMU OLD EU NEW EU ALL EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
95{99 00{06 95{99 00{06 95{99 00{06 95{99 00{06






(22.0) (19.4) (17.3) (13.0) (34.0) (17.0) (10.3) (9.2)
Risk sharing via Government Saving
32.8
¤¤¤ {36.1
¤¤¤ 8.0 {0.3 26.5 15.9
¤ 9.7
¤ 5.2
(12.8) (17.8) (6.8) (11.2) (31.2) (10.4) (6.4) (6.6)
Note: The table reports average risk sharing via private or government saving among the countries in-
cluded in the sample. The results are coe±cient estimates from GLS regressions of the form ¢log NNDIit ¡
¢log(NNDIit ¡ PSit) = ¹i + ° (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it (for private saving). Risk sharing via gov-
ernment saving is estimated in a similar manner with PSit replaced by government saving GSit: Columns (1)
and (2) use a subsample of EMU countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain for the time periods of 1995-1999 and 2000-2006, respectively.
Columns (3) and (4) use a subsample of old EU countries consisting of the EMU countries plus Denmark,
Sweden, and the UK for the time periods of 1995-1999 and 2000-2006, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) use
a subsample of new EU countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,
and Slovenia for the time periods of 1995-1999 and 2000-2006, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) include all
of the above countries in the sample for the time periods of 1995-1999 and 2000-2006, respectively. Num-
bers in parentheses are standard errors.
¤¤¤,
¤¤, and




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Share of Equity and Debt in EU Countries' Portfolios: 2001 and 2006
Country/year 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006
EMU Equity EU Equity EMU Debt EU Debt
Austria 53.5 55.6 64.6 64.9 61.8 65.6 72.2 81.2
Belgium 78.9 79.7 84.8 84.9 75.6 76.7 81.4 84.8
Bulgaria n.a. 92.6 n.a. 94.6 25.6 41.9 26.9 47.6
Cyprus 15.1 10.1 27.7 23.7 21.1 27.9 36.3 51.3
Czech 23.9 75.2 29.3 84.9 50.5 58.3 67.8 75.5
Denmark 25.4 25.6 49.2 45.9 49.7 52.3 68.6 68.3
Estonia 48.4 33.2 83.9 71.6 73.5 70.0 89.4 87.7
Finland 31.1 38.8 64.5 66.5 74.1 72.4 85.3 91.6
France 51.1 50.5 64.7 63.6 58.1 64.7 68.5 76.2
Germany 59.7 69.6 72.3 76.9 64.7 66.6 77.4 80.2
Greece 49.9 43.0 73.5 62.4 34.0 29.8 54.1 66.5
Hungary 40.8 72.0 57.6 80.1 30.1 47.0 44.0 49.1
Ireland 18.5 26.8 43.3 48.0 31.2 38.0 50.4 60.1
Italy 64.3 79.2 71.7 82.6 49.8 65.3 57.4 71.3
Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Luxembourg 37.0 33.6 49.7 45.9 56.6 56.2 67.0 68.3
Malta 23.5 28.9 47.1 48.9 39.0 26.1 48.9 34.3
Netherlands 26.5 25.6 40.3 39.6 66.6 69.0 74.0 77.1
Poland 59.1 52.4 65.2 67.9 30.3 35.1 36.8 51.7
Portugal 65.5 67.3 72.8 78.7 53.4 61.7 59.7 70.4
Romania 83.3 93.8 83.3 97.7 50.0 57.0 50.0 80.7
Slovak 33.3 59.8 75.9 76.3 74.5 62.9 86.5 75.5
Slovenia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain 54.2 77.0 72.9 82.9 67.4 56.7 72.9 69.4
Sweden 33.1 38.2 48.7 51.8 44.7 44.7 58.8 68.1
UK 41.5 30.4 45.2 32.8 42.0 38.6 44.9 41.5
EMU Average 49.2 53.9 64.6 66.4 57.8 60.2 68.4 74.8
Non-EMU EU Average 38.9 47.2 55.7 62.0 44.2 46.8 54.9 61.0
EU Average 44.2 50.7 60.3 64.3 51.0 53.5 61.6 67.9
Note: The table shows the share of equity and debt that European Union countries hold in foreign European
Monetary Union countries and foreign European Union countries relative to total foreign equity and debt


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Risk Sharing and Cumulative Acquired Bank Assets Scaled by Aggregate Assets
All Mergers and Acquisitions 2000{2006
EMU OLD EU NEW EU ALL EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Risk Sharing
Avg. Risk Sharing 10.8 3.3 10.6 3.4
(10.7) (8.1) (7.1) (4.5)
Trend 5.3 1.1 {3.7 {3.8
(6.2) (4.5) (3.9) (2.5)
Bank Consolidation 1.5 0.9 {1.8 0.0
(1.3) (1.3) (2.3) (1.0)
Consumption Risk Sharing
Avg. Risk Sharing 49.0¤¤¤ 33.5¤¤¤ 2.0 15.3¤¤¤
(9.6) (7.4) (11.0) (6.1)
Trend {3.1 1.3 {10.5¤ {1.4
(5.9) (4.0) (5.8) (3.1)
Bank Consolidation {0.1 {2.8¤¤ {4.3 {2.5¤
(1.2) (1.3) (3.7) (1.2)
Note: The results for income risk sharing are coe±cient estimates from the GLS regression: ¢log GNIit ¡
¢log GNIt = ¹i+·(¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt)+²it, where · = ·0+·1t +·2 (INTit ¡ INT). t is a trend, INTit
measures bank integration as the cumulative value of acquired bank assets scaled by aggregate bank assets
in country i in year t in both domestic and foreign merger and acquisitions deals, and INT is the average of
INTit over all years and countries. Consumption risk sharing regressions are estimated in a similar manner
with ¢log GNIit replaced by consumption growth. Column (1) uses a subsample of EMU countries: Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Column
(2) uses the EMU countries plus Denmark, Sweden, and the UK. Column (3) uses a subsample of new EU
countries: Cyprus, Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Column




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Risk Sharing and Cumulative Acquired Bank Assets Scaled by Aggregate Assets
All Mergers and Acquisition Deals 2000{2006
The E®ect of Country-Speci¯c Time Variation in Banking Consolidation
EMU OLD EU NEW EU ALL EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Risk Sharing
Avg. Risk Sharing 11.4 4.0 11.5¤ 3.8
(10.3) (8.0) (6.6) (4.3)
Trend 3.3 1.2 {3.9 {4.7¤
(6.2) (4.4) (3.8) (2.5)
Bank Consolidation 5.7¤¤ 4.3¤ 2.9 2.6
(2.8) (2.6) (4.7) (1.8)
Consumption Risk Sharing
Avg. Risk Sharing 51.8¤¤¤ 39.1¤¤¤ 5.3 16.6¤¤¤
(8.7) (6.5) (10.3) (6.1)
Trend {4.5 1.1 {9.8 {0.7
(5.3) (3.7) (6.3) (3.3)
Bank Consolidation 0.1 {1.3 {3.1 {1.4
(2.7) (3.1) (7.1) (2.7)
Note: The results for income risk sharing are coe±cient estimates from the GLS regression: ¢log GNIit ¡
¢log GNIt = ¹i + ·(¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it, where · = ·0 + ·1t + ·2 (INTit ¡ INTi:). t is a trend,
INTit measures bank integration as the cumulative value of acquired bank assets scaled by aggregate bank
assets in country i in year t in both domestic and foreign merger and acquisitions deals, and INTi: is the
average of INTit over all years for each country i. Consumption risk sharing regressions are estimated in a
similar manner with ¢log GNIit replaced by consumption growth. Column (1) uses a subsample of EMU
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain. Column (2) uses the EMU countries plus Denmark, Sweden, and the UK. Column (3) uses a
subsample of new EU countries: Cyprus, Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this appendix, we display results of risk sharing regressions without country ¯xed e®ects.
Such regressions do not remove the average growth of consumption, output, and income over
the years of the sample and the results will therefore be impacted by longer-run patterns
of risk sharing.
The results of such regressions are quite similar to those including ¯xed e®ects although
there are some di®erences. Without ¯xed e®ects, see Table 16, income risk sharing in the
EMU has not improved since 1999 and consumption risk sharing is lower. We tend to
think the former results is due to the short sample while the later result seems intuitive:
People smooth consumption more a shorter frequencies. At longer horizons (i.e., not in-
cluding country ¯xed e®ects) the e®ects of government and private saving is less volatile,
see Table 17, and there is no impact of government saving except for the new EU countries
after 2000 where government saving helps smooth consumption. The e®ect of foreign asset
holdings on income smoothing is typically much smaller at the longer frequencies as indi-
cated by the results of Tables 18 and 20. The negative correlations of foreign assets with
consumption smoothing are similar but with smaller coe±cients when ¯xed e®ects are not
included, see Tables 19 and 21.
Tables 22 and 23 show results from the regressions without country ¯xed e®ects to
investigate the e®ect of banking consolidation on risk sharing over longer horizons. We
¯nd little evidence of a systematic e®ect on either income or consumption risk sharing,
whether considering all deals, or domestic versus foreign deals, although the asymmetric
e®ect on consumption risk sharing between old and new member countries, as illustrated
in Table 13 appears to be apply also to longer horizons. (The results of Tables 14 and 15
suggest that this asymmetry is due to permanent structural or institutional di®erences in
¯nancial markets in these two groups of countries.)
47Table 16:
Income and Consumption Smoothing among
EMU, Old, New, and All EU member countries.
Without Country Fixed-E®ects.
EMU OLD EU NEW EU ALL EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





¤¤¤ 3.7 3.9 1.7 6.5
¤¤¤ 4.0
¤¤¤











(2.7) (5.4) (3.3) (4.8) (7.2) (4.3) (4.1) (3.2)
Note: See notes to Table 2. The di®erence to Table 2 is that the regressions are estimated as ¢log GNIit ¡
¢log GNIt = constant+·(¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt)+²it, with a constant rather than dummy variables for
each country. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
¤¤¤,
¤¤, and
¤ indicate statistical signi¯cance at
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
48Table 17:
Risk Sharing via Private and Government Saving among EU countries:
EMU, Old, New, and All EU member countries.
Without Country Fixed-E®ects.
EMU OLD EU NEW EU ALL EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
95{99 00{06 95{99 00{06 95{99 00{06 95{99 00{06








(8.2) (12.2) (8.3) (10.9) (27.6) (8.1) (7.8) (4.9)
Risk sharing via Government Saving
0.1 3.1 {1.4 8.8 {12.6 8.2
¤¤¤ 2.7 9.5
¤¤¤
(2.1) (10.6) (1.5) (9.3) (24.5) (4.0) (3.9) (2.9)
Note: See notes to Table 3. The di®erence to Table 3 is that the regressions are estimated as ¢log NNDIit ¡
¢log(NNDIit ¡ PSit) = constant + ° (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it , with a constant rather than dummy






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Risk Sharing and Cumulative Acquired Bank Assets
All Mergers and Acquisition Deals 2000{2006
Without Country Fixed E®ects
EMU OLD EU NEW EU ALL EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Risk Sharing
Avg. Risk Sharing 7.5 2.5 {0.9 3.8¤¤
(5.6) (4.8) (3.7) (1.9)
Trend 1.0 0.0 0.1 {0.4
(2.8) (2.4) (1.4) (0.9)
Bank Consolidation 0.1 {0.4 -1.8 {0.4
(0.9) (0.8) (1.2) (0.4)
Consumption Risk Sharing
Avg. Risk Sharing 26.6¤¤¤ 25.9¤¤¤ 13.5¤¤ 16.6¤¤¤
(5.9) (5.3) (5.9) (2.8)
Trend {1.5 1.7 {7.4¤¤¤ {5.0¤¤¤
(2.6) (2.3) (2.1) (1.4)
Bank Consolidation 0.9 {0.8 {2.3 {0.5
(0.9) (0.9) (1.8) (0.4)
Note: See notes to Table 12. The di®erence to Table 12 is that the results are based on GLS regressions
of the form ¢log GNIit ¡ ¢log GNIt = constant + ·(¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it; with a constant rather



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Income Risk Sharing Consumption Risk Sharing











1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Income Risk Sharing Consumption Risk Sharing
Risk Sharing in EU (%)
Notes: The ¯gure shows (smoothed) estimates of risk sharing for EMU (left panel) and EU (right panel) countries
for each year from 1996 to 2006.
For each year, the extent of income risk sharing is (1 ¡ ¯K;t), where ¯K;t is the estimated regression coe±cient
based on the regression ¢log GNIit ¡ ¢log GNIt = constant + ¯K;t (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it. The extent
of consumption risk sharing is (1¡¯C;t), where ¯C;t is the estimated regression coe±cient based on the regression
¢log Cit ¡ ¢log Ct = constant + ¯C;t (¢log GDPit ¡ ¢log GDPt) + ²it. Data source: Eurostat.















































































CY CZ EE HU LT LV PL SI SK
2000 2006
Notes: The ﬁgure shows foreign ownership of bank assets relative to aggregate bank assets in “old” EU countries
(upper panel) and in “new” EU countries (lower panel) for the years 2000 and 2006. Foreign ownership is deﬁned
as an equity stake of 50 percent or higher held by investors registered in another EU country. Data source: Bureau
van Dijk, Bankscope.



























































BG CY CZ EE HU LT LV PL SI SK
domestic foreign
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the total number of domestic and foreign merger and acquisition deals between banks
located in “old” EU countries (upper panel), and between banks located in “new” EU countries (lower panel)
during the period 2000–2006. Data source: Bureau van Dijk, Zephyr.































































































CY CZ EE HU LT LV PL SI SK
domestic  foreign
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the cumulative value of bank assets acquired in domestic and foreign M&A deals between
banks located in EU member countries during the period 2000-2006, scaled by aggregate bank assets in 2006,
in “old” EU countries (upper panel) and in “new” EU countries (lower panel). Data source: Bureau van Dijk,
Bankscope and Zephyr.
59